



Basic facts about the Border and Immigration

Collected and curated by:
Ev Meade and Greg Prieto


December 2017

Info: transborder@san Diego.edu




1. THERE IS NO CRISIS ON THE BORDER

40-year Low: Border Patrol Apprehensions



40-year Low in Total Apprehensions: FY 1925 TO 2016 (Including ICE, but not “Inadmissibles”) – border + interior enforcement




Apprehensions
2016 = 530,250
2017 = 421,000



2. THE UNDOCUMENTED POPULATION IS STABLE, SETTLED AND SLOWLY DECLINING

Estimated unauthorized immigrant population in the U.S. rises, falls, then stabilizes

In millions



Note: Shading surrounding line indicates low and high points of the estimated 90% confidence interval. The 2009-2014 change is not statistically significant at 90% confidence interval. Data labels are for 1990, 1995, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013 and 2014.

Source: Pew Research Center estimates for 2005-2014 based on augmented American Community Survey data (IPUMS); for 1995-2004 based on March Supplements of the Current Population Survey. Estimates for 1990 from Warren and Warren (2013).
"Overall Number of U.S. Unauthorized Immigrants Holds Steady Since 2009"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

The undocumented population in the U.S. :

1. Stable, not growing; and
2. In slow decline

Undocumented Immigrants in San Diego County: A Settled Population (MPI, January 2015)

- Average time in the United States = 12.5 years

In SD County, 180k


- 80% more than 5 years
- 77% over 25 years old
- 67% employed full-time
- 35% have and reside with USC children
- 25% own a home
- 6% speak only Spanish



Figure 2

Mexican Immigrant Population in the U.S. in Decline

In millions



No rush of migrants flooding across the border.

Mexican Migration

- Net Negative, since 2009 (Pew research study shows net loss of 140,000 since 2009)
- Net zero 2005-09
- End of large, but highly specific migration cycle
- FY 2014 Mexicans did not constitute majority of border apprehensions

Source: For 1850 to 1980: Gibson, Campbell and Kay Jung, "Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 1850-2000," U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, Working Paper No. 81, 2006; for Mexican born 1980 and 1990: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-USA); for 2005 to 2012: Pew Research Center estimates based on augmented American Community Surveys; for 1995-2000 and 2013-2014 Pew Research Center estimates based on augmented March supplements to the Current Population Survey and 2000 Decennial Census.

Bad Hombres?

- High profile detentions of undocumented immigrants under the current administration have included:
 - Juan Carlos Hernandez, a restaurant owner and community leader in Frankfurt, Illinois (currently free on bail)
 - Daniela Vargas, a DACA recipient in Jackson, Mississippi whose DACA status had lapsed due to her inability to pay the biennial fee, but is currently in process. She is currently detained.
 - Guadalupe Garcia de Rayos, a mother of two in Phoenix who was detained and deported while complying with a periodic check-in with immigration authorities. Her deportable offense was using a false social security number.
 - María Robles-Rodríguez, a mother of two in Escondido, California, who did not have a criminal record, was detained and deported.

Immigration and Crime


- Numerous studies have found that immigrants are less likely to commit crimes than natives, based on both incarceration rates and correlations between immigrant populations and local crime rates. (Martinez and Lee, 2000; Mears, 2002; *Sampson et al. 2005; Ousey and Kubrin 2014, for a review see Ousey and Kubrin 2017)
- Ewing, Martinez, and Rumbaut found that in 2010, **10.7 percent of native-born men aged 18-39 without a high school degree** were incarcerated compared to 2.8 percent of Mexican immigrants and **1.7 percent of Guatemalan and Salvadoran immigrants.**
- In 2008, in an effort to measure the criminal risk posed specifically by undocumented immigrants, Hickman and Suttrop found no difference in the rate of recidivism between deportable and non-deportable non-citizens.
- In 2014, Miles and Cox found that the Secure Communities immigration enforcement program “led to no meaningful reductions in the FBI index crime rate. Nor has it reduced rates of violent crime—homicide, rape, robbery, or aggravated assault.”
- *Of immigrant youth who have committed a crime, Bersani and et al (2014) found that “first generation immigrants are less likely to be involved in serious offending and to evidence persistence in offending, and appear to be on a path toward desistance much more quickly than their [native born] peers.”
- *This literature is often critiqued for relying on self-reported criminal activities on surveys. The concern is that undocumented immigrants in particular are more prone to lie to an authority for fear of deportation. Bersani and Piquero (2016) tested this association by comparing self-reported arrests by immigrants to local arrest records and found that immigrants accurately reported their arrests 87% of the time. The association between immigration and lower rates of criminal activity is not due to immigrants under-reporting their criminal activity.

*Immigration and Crime

Immigrants commit fewer crimes than their 2nd gen and native born peers. Notably, the 2nd gen "catches up" to the native born, largely as a consequence of assimilation.

First and Second Generation Immigrant Offending Trajectories


Prevalence of each group involved in at least 1 crime in the previous 12 months



Source: *Justice Quarterly*
PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Immigrant Anti-sociality

- In 2013, Vaughn, Salas-Wright, DeLisi, and Maynard found that rates of antisocial behavior among immigrants were lower than among native-born populations across the board.



*Fiscal Impacts

Do immigrants cost more (in entitlements) than they contribute (in taxes)? Not under most scenarios (National Academies 2016)




FIGURE 8-23 Net fiscal impacts of immigration, by budget scenario, treatment of public goods, and average characteristics of new immigrants.

*Fiscal Impacts

- If we estimate into the future, over a 75 year period, and include the descendants of immigrants, we find a net positive fiscal effect

TABLE 8-17 75-year Present Value Flows for Consolidated Federal, State, and Local Governments for Three Future Budget Scenarios, by Grouped Ages of Immigrant Arrival in the United States, with Public Goods (defense, federal subsidies, and rest-of-world payments) Included in Incremental Benefit Costs to Immigrants and Descendants (flows in thousands of 2012 dollars)

	CBO Long-term Budget Outlook											
	Total Impact				Immigrant				Descendants			
	0-24	25-64	65+	Avg.	0-24	25-64	65+	Avg.	0-24	25-64	65+	Avg.
Total Net												
<HS	-77	-254	-279	-201	-32	-247	-279	-158	-45	-47	0%	-43
HS	127	-112	-187	-33	84	-99	-187	-39	42	-14	0%	6
SomCol	288	82	-178	171	180	50	-178	104	108	33	0%	67
BA	384	426	-183	395	245	316	-183	279	139	110	0%	116
>BA	339	915	-123	725	231	754	-123	583	108	161	0%	142
Avg.	180	195	-224	173	121	147	-224	123	59	48	0%	50
Taxes												
<HS	778	340	38	503	382	216	38	272	396	125	0%	230
HS	942	475	33	620	482	318	33	365	461	157	0%	255
SomCol	1,096	659	40	844	576	438	40	491	521	220	0%	354
BA	1,159	978	53	1,005	638	682	53	649	521	296	0%	355
>BA	1,088	1,445	78	1,314	618	1,101	78	939	469	344	0%	375
Avg.	989	771	43	822	521	543	43	515	468	228	0%	307
Benefits												
<HS	855	634	317	703	414	462	317	430	441	172	0%	273
HS	816	587	220	653	397	416	220	404	418	170	0%	249
SomCol	809	576	218	674	396	389	218	387	413	188	0%	287
BA	775	551	236	610	394	365	236	370	381	186	0%	240
>BA	749	529	201	589	388	346	201	356	361	183	0%	233
Avg.	809	576	267	649	400	396	267	392	409	179	0%	256

*Fiscal Impacts

- If we compare young adult immigrants with the native born, we find that at all educational levels except the BA, immigrants have a larger positive or a less negative fiscal impact than their native born peers.

TABLE 8-13 75-year Net Present Value Flows Comparing an Immigrant Arriving at Age 25 with a Native-born Person Followed from Age 25, for Consolidated Government Finances under Two Future Budget Scenarios, by Educational Attainment, Varying the Treatment of Public Goods (in thousands of 2012 dollars)

		CBO Long-term Budget Outlook			No Budget Adjustments		
		Total	Individual	Descendants	Total	Individual	Descendants
No Public Goods Included in Benefits							
<HS	Immigrant	-186	-109	-77	-246	-87	-159
	Native	<u>-388</u>	<u>-251</u>	<u>-137</u>	<u>-427</u>	<u>-234</u>	<u>-193</u>
	Imm-Nat	202	142	60	181	147	34
HS	Immigrant	72	49	23	-79	21	-100
	Native	<u>14</u>	<u>61</u>	<u>-47</u>	<u>-139</u>	<u>-7</u>	<u>-132</u>
	Imm-Nat	58	-12	70	60	28	32
SomCol	Immigrant	347	205	142	109	136	-27
	Native	<u>262</u>	<u>208</u>	<u>54</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>-71</u>
	Imm-Nat	85	-3	88	83	39	44
BA	Immigrant	821	514	307	433	361	72
	Native	<u>895</u>	<u>684</u>	<u>211</u>	<u>473</u>	<u>446</u>	<u>27</u>
	Imm-Nat	-74	-170	96	-40	-85	45
>BA	Immigrant	1,362	972	390	795	670	125
	Native	<u>1,344</u>	<u>1,020</u>	<u>324</u>	<u>766</u>	<u>674</u>	<u>92</u>
	Imm--Nat	18	-48	66	29	-4	33

*Labor Market Effects

- Do immigrants lower the wages of the native born?
No, not in general. For US-born workers who did not complete high school, there is evidence of small negative wage effect.

TABLE 5-2 Effect on Native Wages of an Inflow of Immigrants That Increases Labor Supply by 1 Percent

Study	Wage Effect (%)	Which Natives
A. Spatial Studies		
Altonji and Card (1991)	<u>-1.7</u>	Dropouts, black men
	<u>-1.0</u>	Dropouts
Borjas (2016b)	-1.4	Dropouts, non-Hispanic men
	-0.5	Dropouts, non-Hispanic men
Monras (2015)	-0.7	High school graduates or less, non-Hispanic, including immigrants
Cortés (2008)	-0.6	Dropouts, Hispanic with poor English
	-0.3	Dropouts, Hispanic
	-0.1	Dropouts
Card (2001)	-0.1	Men
	0.1	Women
Peri and Yasenov (2015)	0.3	Dropouts, non-Cuban

B. Skill Cell Studies

Llull (2015)	<u>-1.7</u>	Men
Borjas (2003)	<u>-0.6</u>	Men
Card and Peri (2016)	<u>-0.2</u>	Men
Card and Peri (2016)	-0.1	Men

C. Structural Studies

	-0.8	Dropouts
	-0.4	All
	-0.4	Dropouts
	-0.3	Dropouts
	-0.2	All
	0.1	All
	0.1	Dropouts



3. BIG STRUCTURAL FORCES DRIVE MIGRATION PATTERNS, NOT ELECTORAL POLITICS

Prelude: The 1980 Republican Primary Debate

- https://youtu.be/lxi9_cciy8w




Mexican Migration Net Negative, since 2009

Pew research study shows net loss of 140,000 since 2009 (net zero 2005-09)

- Macro-economy
 - Recession and job loss in U.S. – some economists dispute importance
 - Growth in Mexico
 - GDP up 35% 2009-2014
 - Largest economy in Hispanic world for first time
 - Tijuana as city of net immigration
- End of a massive migration cycle (similar to what happened with Irish, Germans, or African-Americans coming from the South)
- Changing demographics
 - Declining birthrate
 - Aging population
- U.S. border enforcement – more difficult and dangerous to cross in either direction, so settlement has to be more permanent
 - Increase in Border Patrol from 4.2k in 1994 to 21k in 2011
 - Nearly 700 miles of fencing built since 1994
 - Dramatic increase in the number of “aggravated felonies” or deportable offenses since 1996
 - Perception of the U.S. declining in Mexico
- The drug war – Opportunity seekers don’t want to have to deal with gangsters, they hear about extortion, kidnapping, rape, etc.



ICE Removals: Obama and Trump



*Data for removals, excluding "returns"

Deportations under Obama

- Obama Admin. = 2.8 million
- Bush Admin. = 2.0 million
- All 1892 to 1997 = 2.1 million
- Deportees with “criminal conviction”
 - 31% in 2008
 - 59% in 2015
- More than 80% of these = “Priority 1”
- Illegal re-entry an immigration-related criminal offenses growing, from 5% to 30% of federal docket (78% of federal public defender caseload)

Other harsh measures:



- Worksite raids (Postville, 2009)
- Information sharing (Secure Communities) (2008)
- Detention bed quota of 34k, now at 45k actual
- Family detention (2014)
- “Rocket dockets” (2014)



Takeaways:


1. Little historical precedent for hundreds of thousands of annual deportations
2. Rather than partisan issue, bipartisan legal change in 1996 made it much easier to get deported
3. Talk of deporting “felons” or criminals is misleading

Mexican-origin population, by county, %



2010


U.S. Hispanic Population Percent Change by County from 2000 to 2010




© 2011 Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2010

POST-WAR MIGRATION TO THE SUNBELT AND WEST COAST






The poorest do not migrate internationally

What do these Maps Mean?

- Natural demographic shift in a region bisected by the border
- Settlement of a “frontier” in both countries
- Social and family are networks key to the pattern
- Follows general Sun-Belt migration pattern in the U.S.
- Follows northward migration pattern in Mexico
- North American integration has created growth on both side of the border
- The most recent phase of migration went to different areas of the United States, with less migration history (change over time shapes perception more than actual numbers or impact)
- This migration also followed general internal migration pattern of the U.S., and it is driven more by opportunity than poverty





4. DETERRENCE MEANS DEATH

Operation Gatekeeper, 1994

- 1994 initiative to fortify the U.S.-Mexico border beginning at urban crossings, such as San Diego sector
- Began with 5.5 miles of new fencing from Pacific Ocean to San Ysidro Crossing, then moved East
- Doubled INS budget 1994-1997
- Doubled number of Border Patrol agents 1994-1997
- Followed by a series of related measures in El Centro, Tucson, and other BP sectors
- Led to increase in Border Patrol from 4.2k in 1994 to 21k in 2011
- Undocumented crossing moved from urban centers to remote deserts and death rate shot up, first in CA and then in AZ
- 6,915 deaths on the border since 1998 (as acknowledged by DHS)
- NGO estimates are closer to 11k – (they include cases w/out official death certificate and those that occurred on Mexican territory)



see IOM Study:

https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/fataljourneys_countingtheuncounted.pdf

Map of Border Patrol sectors and location of the border fence and SBInet

- State boundary
- Border Patrol sector
- Fence completed
(Data source: OBP)
- Fence under construction
(Data source: USACE)
- Fence planned/under contract
(Data source: USACE)
- ★ SBInet



Source: GAO analysis of CBP data; Map Resources (map); U.S. Customs and Border Protection (fence).

Note: The depiction of the fence was derived from various digital database sources. Customs and Border Protection assumes no responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions. Fence depiction is not to scale. The map is conceptual and does not depict the actual size of the fence.

Big Bend – the border here is a deep canyon, with Rio Grande surrounded by peaks between 1,800 and 8,000 feet.

Deaths on the Border by Fiscal Year (U.S. Border Patrol)





Figure 1. PCOME Deaths Coded as UBCs
FY1990-2012 (N = 2,238)



*Data from the Pima County, AZ Medical Examiner marks the dramatic rise in deaths after the construction of the border fence in Nogales, and enhanced enforcement in Tucson. Pima County includes the Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument and the Tohono O'Odham Nation Reservation, two of the largest and most dangerous wilderness crossing areas along the U.S.-Mexico border between AZ and Sonora, Mexico.




Trends and Relationships

- Deaths don't end at the U.S.-Mexico border – there are thousands more than happen within Mexico, everywhere from the border with Guatemala north, and estimates range as high as 30,000. CNDH (MX) – found in 2012 that 11k migrants had been kidnapped in the previous year alone.
- Deaths on the border do not correspond directly with apprehensions – both are down now, although the IOM has found some reverse correlation (see next slide)
- Physical danger is part of the strategy of deterrence – think about DJ case.
- Deaths are part of a culture of cruelty and impunity – denial of water and food, physical abuse, disrupting humanitarian aid
- Enforcement policies do not distinguish between different kinds of migrants




Figure 2.2: Migrant deaths recorded by the United States Border Patrol relative to apprehensions on the south-western border, fiscal year 1998–2013




Source: United States Border Patrol, 2014.

Figure 2.5: California migrant death estimates by data source (excluding Yuma area), 1993–2013



Sources: Eschbach, K. et al., 1999, Death at the border, *International Migration Review*, 33(2):430–454; Cornelius, W.A., 2001, Deaths at the border: Efficacy and unintended consequences of US immigration control policy, *Population and Development Review*, 27(4):661–685; United States Border Patrol, 2014.

Figure 2.7: Arizona migrant death estimates by data source (excluding Yuma area), 1990–2013



Sources: Eschbach, K. et al., 1999, Death at the border, *International Migration Review*, 33(2):430–454; Cornelius, W.A., 2001, Deaths at the border: Efficacy and unintended consequences of US immigration control policy, *Population and Development Review*, 27(4):661–685; Martínez, D. et al., 2014, Structural violence and migrant deaths in southern Arizona: Data from the Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner, 1990–2013, *Journal on Migration and Human Security*, 2(4):257; United States Border Patrol, 2014.



4. THE "BORDER" IS EVERYWHERE

The Land Border is a Red herring

- Most undocumented immigrants do not use land border (which is incredibly dangerous, thanks both to geography and organized crime)
- The number of visa overstays for FY 2015, 50% higher than apprehensions on the border (and most arrived at one of the more than 300 official ports of entry not on the U.S-Mexico border) – 527,000 vs. 337,000
- 40% of the current undocumented population of 11 million overstayed visas
- Overstays still constitute only 1% of the 45 million legal entries for FY 2015



The Backlog

- Current backlog = 630k cases (FY2017)
- Current wait for initial hearing = 696 days
- Current wait for substantive immigration hearing = c. 5 years
- U.S. immigration and border enforcement = \$19 billion/year
- U.S. immigration courts and adjudication = \$360 million/year
- Number of immigration judges
= 258 (Trump Admin. has appointed 47 new IJ's, but still fewer than 300)




*“Get In Line”: The Prospects for Legal Migration


- Prospective legal immigrants are subject to a per country visa cap that limits the number of visas that can be awarded to any country annually (~26,000). No limit is applied to immediate family members. For every other category of family preference admissions, for instance, the line can be decades long. This artificially produced backlog creates a structural pressure to migrate without authorization.

Family-Sponsored	All Chargeability Areas Except Those Listed	CHINA-mainland born	INDIA	MEXICO	PHILIPPINES
F1	01FEB11	01FEB11	01FEB11	01APR96	01JAN05
F2A	22DEC15	22DEC15	22DEC15	15NOV15	22DEC15
F2B	22NOV10	22NOV10	22NOV10	22JUL96	01JUL06
F3	08SEP05	08SEP05	08SEP05	22MAY95	08MAR95
F4	08JUN04	08JUN04	22NOV03	08OCT97	01AUG94

Spending on Immigration Enforcement and Courts



Minimum Percentage of Cases that Go to Trial




Numbers from Executive Office for Immigration Review, 2014

- IJs lack authority to order pre-trial conferences
- Cases are rarely resolved without judges
- Ten times the number of cases go to trial compared to other systems

“Like holding death penalty cases in traffic court”

- Dana L. Marks, San Francisco Immigration Judge and president of the National Association of Immigration Judges

Effect of counsel on case success for non-detained noncitizens, 2005-2012



Numbers for this chart obtained from Katzmann Study Group, 2011

Lessons


- Language, repetition, and mediation matter
- Servility and desperation make racism, not the other way around
- Nostalgia, amnesia and roll-back – historical amnesia facilitates the roll-back of hard-won gains
- Technology abets behaviorism – confirmation bias, predilection for vengeance, spectacle and visual culture
- Globalization confronts tribalism – sympathy, empathy, and anomie






5. THOSE WHO ARE TRYING TO CROSS THE LAND BORDER ARE INCREASINGLY DESPERATE AND VULNERABLE

The Other Migrants



- Long-term average = 5,000/year
- Arrivals FY2000 = 3,664
- Arrivals FY 2014 = 68,541
- Arrivals FY2017 = 29,375

Unaccompanied Immigrant Children



Trafficking Victims' Protection Reauthorization Act (2008)

- Custody of Office of Refugee Resettlement (at HSS), child welfare agency
- Released to “sponsors” rather than detained
- Cannot be deported without seeing an immigration judge
- Easier access to “SIJS” for abused neglected and abandoned kids
- Expanded access to “T” and “U” Visas
- Those from “contiguous countries” eligible for “voluntary departure” without hearing (meaning that Mexican children are excluded, de facto)



Why are they coming?

UNHCR Report: *Children on the Run* (2014) (Interviewed 404 kids, ages 12-17, 72 questions)


- **Majority of UA kids cited improved educational and job opportunities in U.S., but it was almost never the *only* reason**
- More than half (58%) of UA kids potentially eligible for international protection (13% in 2006)
 - El Salvador = 72%
 - Guatemala = 38%
 - Honduras = 57%
 - Mexico = 64%




The Nature of the Violence

- Girls fleeing forced relationships, rape, and murder
- Boys unable to escape gang IDs (even false ones), or caught in the crossfire
- Kids whose parents have been killed or disappeared
- Families targeted by extortion rackets
- Trying to escape “Zones of impunity”
- Targeted on public busses and other public places
- Violent repression of protestors and civil society more broadly

Population in Poverty




Human Development Index, 2013






http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?order=wbapi_data_value_2012+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=asc


Remittances as percentage of GDP, 2012 (World Bank)




Average U.S. Military Aid per capita, 2009-2015



Total Appropriated U.S. Aid, per capita



Homicide Rates per 100k (UNDOC)



Not Just Unaccompanied Children

- In FY2014, 68k adults from Central America = exactly equal to unaccompanied children
- Number of asylum seekers from Mexico has more than doubled since 2011
- Fleeing similar circumstances
- Less protection available
- “Rocket docket”
- Family detention center in Artesia, NM (closed 2014)
- Replaced by private family detention center in Dilley TX (2,400 beds)



Family Detention

- DHS has expanded detention of mothers and children by more than 4,000% from approximately 85 detention beds to nearly 3,800 beds.
- Built quickly in order to expedite deportation and deter future migrants and refugees
- Negative physical and mental health effects
- Impedes due process
- Less effective credible-fear interviews with children present
- Challenged in court – Federal Judge in Central Dist. CA found that it family detention violates consent decree in Flores v. Reno





Asylum Grant Rate, FY 2003-2015

